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Analysis methods for fault trees that contain
secondary failures
S Dunnett* and J D Andrews
Department of Aeronautical and Automotive Engineering, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire, UK
Abstract: The fault tree methodology is appropriate when the component level failures (basic events)
occur independently. One situationwhere the conditions of independence are not met occurs when secondary
failure events appear in the fault tree structure. Guidelines for fault tree construction that have been utilized
for many years encourage the inclusion of secondary failures along with primary failures and command
faults in the representation of the failure logic. The resulting fault tree is an accurate representation of the
logic but may produce inaccurate quantitative results for the probability and frequency of system failure if
methodologies are used that rely on independence. This paper illustrates how inaccurate these quantitative
results can be. Alternative approaches are developed by which fault trees of this type of structure can be
analysed.
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NOTATION
E control system component E fails
F2 second initiating failure event
PRV pressure relief valve failure
q component unavailability
qCi minimal cut set, Ci, unavailability
qi(t) probability of the system being in state i at time t
Q system unavailability
T tank failure under normal load
U unrevealed failure
w system failure intensity
X control system component X fails
y inspection interval
l failure rate
n repair rate
t mean time to repair
1 INTRODUCTION
Fault tree analysis is now frequently used to assess the
adequacy of systems from a reliability or availability view-
point. The technique was originally developed in the 1960s,
and guidelines were subsequently produced to describe
how the engineering system can be modelled [1]. Modelling
the system results in a representation of the failure logic
which can then be quanti ed [2, 3]. Model quanti cation
produces combinations of component level failures that will
cause the system failure mode (minimal cut sets), system
failure probability, system failure frequency and importance
measures.
It is critical that the fault tree construction process be
performed accurately. Following this, there are many
commercial software packages available to carry out
the quanti cation. Rules cannot be determined that
govern the construction of the failure logic diagram and
guarantee the production of the correct fault tree for all
circumstances. However, guidelines that provide a rigorous,
systematic approach have been developed and are
commonly applied by engineers. One such guideline that
can be found in reference [1] is that state-of-component
faults can be developed in the fault tree structure by an OR
gate with primary failure, secondary failure and command
faults as inputs.
This paper shows that following this process while
producing correct failure logic can lead to situations where
the standard means of quantifying the top event probability
will be incorrect. The error occurs as the repair of individual
component failures in a minimal cut set does not rectify the
system state.
Two approaches are described that can be used to over-
come this dif culty. The  rst of these employs a Markov
model to analyse the sections of the fault tree where the
secondary failures are located. The second method makes
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use of equations pre-determined from Markov models of
basic constructs that occur in sections of the fault tree
containing secondary failures. Both of these methods
require the section of the fault tree to which the method is
applied to be independent of the remainder of the fault tree.
In the  rst method this is the limiting factor governing the
size of the fault tree section modelled using Markov.
2 FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION FOR
STATE-OF-COMPONENT FAULTS
A guideline proposed for the fault tree construction process
[1] was to classify events to be developed in the fault tree as
either state-of component faults or state-of-system faults.
The distinction between the two was based on whether the
event being developed could be caused by a single compo-
nent failure or not. Where the event cannot be caused by a
single component failure it is classi ed as a state-of-system
fault and developed by establishing the immediate, neces-
sary and suf cient conditions,which usually brings an AND
gate into the fault tree. If a single component failure can
cause the event it is classed as a state-of-component fault
and the fault tree is developed in terms of primary compo-
nent failures, secondary component failures and command
faults, as shown in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1 a primary failure is de ned as a component
failure that occurs when the component is operating in its
normal expected environment. A secondary failure is one
where the component is operating outside its intended
operating environment (usually owing to other failures
occurring and causing an increased stress level on the
component). The command fault traces the fault back into
other parts of the system that provide an input to the
component and could cause a working component to exhibit
the fault being developed. For example, consider a control
valve subsystem. To identify causes of the event where no
 uid  ows at the valve outlet, it is classi ed as a state-of-
component fault and developed as shown in Fig. 1. The
primary component failure is the control valve itself failing
closed. A command fault is a failure of the valve control
system that causes a functioning valve to close.
This approach has also been incorporated into texts that
cover the fault tree method in detail [2, 3]. It is an effective
way of generating a fault tree with the correct failure logic
and is in itself non-controversial. The potential problem
comes in the later analysis stage where all basic events in the
fault tree structure are assumed to occur independently. The
construction of the fault tree using this guideline introduces
dependencies between the repair of the basic events.
A secondary failure causes the failure of another component
in the system, and so the recti cation of the system
functionality requires the repair of more components than
those that combined to cause the original problem. Failure
adequately to account for this, by, for example, assuming
independence between the basic events, can introduce large
errors into the numerical procedures used to calculate the
top event probability and frequency.
3 PRESSURE TANK EXAMPLE
As an example, consider the simple part of a pressure tank
system illustrated in Fig. 2. The tank is  lled by activating
the pump. The contents are used as required by opening and
closing the outlet valve. As a safety feature, in the event of
over lling, the relief valve will open to keep the pressure
within acceptable bounds. It is required to predict the
unavailability of the pressure tank owing to its rupture.
This can be classi ed as a state-of-component fault since
failure of the tank alone can produce this event. The fault
tree is then developed accordingly.
The top Event, ‘rupture of the pressure tank’, is devel-
oped as illustrated in Fig. 1 and resolved into its primary and
secondary causes (in this example the tank does not have a
command fault). The primary failure event is that the tank
fails under normal expected conditions (TANK). The
secondary failure event occurs when the tank fails while
operating outside its normal expected operating conditions
and is caused by an overpressure situation. The overpressure
that ruptures the tank (assuming overpressure will always
have this outcome) is due to a pump control system failure
that causes the pump to run for too long AND to the safety
Fig. 1 Fault tree for a state-of-component fault Fig. 2 Simple pressure tank system
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feature (the pressure relief valve) failing to operate. The
event ‘fault in control system fails to stop pump’ is also a
state-of-component fault and therefore developed in terms of
its primary failure of E and secondary failure X. The simple
fault tree for this situation is represented in Fig. 3. The
minimal cut sets for this fault tree are:
(a) TANK,
(b) E. PRV,
(c) X. PRV.
The implication of the qualitative analysis is that the repair
of any of the events contained in a minimal cut set causing
the top event will result in the system failure mode no longer
existing. However, when one of the events is a secondary
failure, this is no longer true. Consider minimal cut set 2. If
these two events E and PRVoccur together, then, in addition
to these two components being in the failed state, the tank
will also fail. This is not an event in the minimal cut set.
Considering the minimal cut set alone, if the pump or
pressure relief valve are repaired it would, under conditions
of independence, rectify the top event. However, since this
failure is a secondary failure combination and results in tank
rupture, the tank must also be repaired to rectify the system.
Since the repair time of the tank is likely to be considerably
longer than that of the two elements of the minimal cut set,
failure to account for this in the analysis will result in a
serious underestimation of the system unavailability.
It should also be noted that the pressure relief valve
failure, PRV, is an enabling event [4]. i.e. one that permits
another event to cause the top event. It is a failure of a safety
device that, since it is normally inactive, will, on its own,
have no effect on the system unless the occurrence of
an initiating event [4] puts a demand on it to work. All
other events in the fault tree are initiating events whose
occurrence, unless mitigated, will cause the top event.
Basic event failure and repair data are given in Table 1. A
conventional analysis of the fault tree illustrated in Fig. 2
with the basic event data given in Table 1 gives a top event
probability of 3.3626 1072 and a top event frequency of
1.3876 1073h71. A summary of the contribution to these
results from each minimal cut set is given in Table 2. The
full calculations are presented in Appendix 1.
These results have been obtained assuming independence
of the basic events. The correct modelling of a section of the
fault tree that features secondary failures would need to
be performed using techniques such as the Markov methods
[2] that can take into account the repair time dependence.
4 MARKOVANALYSIS
Prior to performing a Markov analysis of the system, a
number of assumptions are required as to how the system
will be repaired. These are as follows:
1. If both X and E fail, PRV will be activated, revealing E.
If only E is repaired, X will cause E to fail again, and
hence both E and X are repaired.
2. If E or X fails, causing PRV to be activated, it is assumed
that there is no mechanism by which PRV can subse-
quently fail in an inactive (stuck) mode.
3. If PRV fails  rst and subsequently E (or X) fails, then the
tank will rupture and hence PRV, E (or X) and Twill need
to be repaired.
4. When the repair of more than one component is to be
performed, it is assumed that they will be repaired
sequentially and so the repair time for all components
will be the sum of their individual repair times.
The values used for these additional repair times are given in
Table 3.
The Markov model for the system, which provides a
direct alternativemeans of analysis to the fault tree in Fig. 3,
is shown in Fig. 4. A list of the different states and the
transitions between them is contained in Appendix 2.
In Fig. 4, li and ni are the failure and repair rates for the
basic events and so i E, T, X and P. Where more than one
letter appears as the subscript for the repair rate, this
indicates a list of components whose repair is performed
sequentially. The Markov model has been constructed in two
phases to model the periodic inspection process carried out
on the pressure relief valve, PRV. Phase 1 is a continuous
phase that operates from t 0 to t y, the inspection
interval for PRV. During phase 1, a failure of this component
on its own will remain unrevealed, as indicated by the ‘U’
de ning its condition in states 5 and 8. The failure of the
relief valve in phase 1 will only be revealed by a demand on
it to function (failure of E or X). Transitions between statesFig. 3 Pressure tank system fault tree
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in this phase are indicated by a solid line in Fig. 4. Phase 2 is
a discrete, instantaneous phase where the inspection takes
place and reveals failures of the relief valve and transfers its
status to ‘F’ (revealed failure awaiting repair) and enables
the component to be repaired as indicated by states 11
and 14. Instantaneous transitions occur every y hours and
are shown as a dotted line in Fig. 4. Phases 1 and 2 occur
cyclically until the mission time is reached.
The resulting Markov model has 15 states. Examination
will indicate that a more concise model could have been
developed, as several states could have been merged into
one. For example, states 10, 13 and 15 all feature the four
components in the failed state. The model has deliberately
been constructed in this way to take account of the order
in which the failures occur and enable the contribution that
each minimal cut set makes to the system failure to be
identi ed. Where the occurrence of failures causes the
secondary failure of another component, this is indicated
by ‘(F)’ in the state de nitions; F2 indicates that this was the
second (initiating) failure event. For this model, states 2, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 15 are all failed states. The state
equations for phase 1 are given by
dq1
dt
(lE lX lP lT)q1 nEq3 nEXq4
nPq11 nTq2 nTEq6 nTEXq7 nTPq14
nTEP(q9 q12) nALL(q10 q13 q15)
dq2
dt
lTq1 (nT lX lP lE)q2
dq3
dt
lEq1 (nE lX lT)q3
dq4
dt
lX(q1 q3) (lT nEX)q4
dq5
dt
lPq1 nTq8 (lE lX lT)q5
dq6
dt
lEq2 lTq3 (nTE lX)q6
dq7
dt
lTq4 lXq2 lXq6 nTEXq7
dq8
dt
lPq2 lTq5 (nT lX lE)q8
dq9
dt
lE(q5 q11) (nTEP lX)q9
dq10
dt
lX(q5 q11) nALLq10
dq11
dt
(nP lT lE lX)q11
dq12
dt
lE(q8 q14) (nTEP lX)q12
dq13
dt
lX(q8 q12 q14) nALLq13
dq14
dt
lTq11 (nTP lE lX)q14
dq15
dt
lXq9 nALLq15
For phase 2, at t ny the equations for qi, i 5, 8, 11, 14, are
q11 q11 q5
q5 0
q14 q14 q8
q8 0
These equations were solved for qi, i 1, , 15. The
probability of system failure, the probability of the
top event featured in the fault tree shown in Fig. 3, is
given by
Q q2 q6 q7 q8 q9 q10 q12 q13
q14 q15
and the failure intensity by
w lT(q1 q3 q4 q5 q11) (q5 q11)(lE lX)
Table 1 Component failure and repair data
Basic event
code
Failure
rate (h71)
Mean time
to repair (h)
Inspection
interval (h)
Type of failure:
dormant (enabler)
or revealed (initiator)
TANK 16 1077 500 R
PRV 56 1074 25 1975 D
E 26 1073 24 R
X 26 1073 24 R
Table 2 Minimal cut set contributions to the top event
Minimal cut set Probability q Frequency w
TANK 4.999756 1075 9.99956 1078
E. PRV 0.01693 7.05346 1074
X. PRV 0.01693 7.05346 1074
Table 3 Component combination repair time
Repair of
components
Mean time to
repair t (h)
Repair
rate n (h71)
E T 524 0.0019
E T X 548 0.0018
P T 525 1.904766 1073
E P T 549 1.82156 1073
E X 48 0.0208
E P X 73 0.0137
E P 49 0.02041
E P X T (all) 573 1.74526 1073
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Results for the failure probability and failure frequency
using the Markov model are contained in Table 4 and
shown in Fig. 5 (averages taken over second and subse-
quent periods). A comparison of the Markov results with
those produced by the fault tree method are also shown in
Table 4. The contributions from each of the three minimal
cut sets are included. It can be seen from the results in
Table 4 that there is a very large error in the fault tree
results.
5 QUANTIFICATION APPROACHES FOR
SECONDARY FAILURES
It is clear from the example given above that there can be a
signi cant error if fault trees that contain secondary failures
are quanti ed by traditional techniques which assuming
independence. The size of the error will vary depending
on the fault tree structure, the failure and repair data used
and the number of secondary failure events it contains.
Fig. 4 System Markov state transition diagram
Table 4 Comparison of Markov and fault tree results
Markov results Fault tree results
Event States Average Q Maximum Q Average w (h71) Maximum w (h71) Q w
System fails Any minimal cut sets 0.1652 0.1794 2.956 1074 3.276 1074 0.03362 1.3876 1073
Minimal cut set 1 2, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14 4.4256 1075 4.476 1075 8.356 1078 8.546 1078 4.999756 1075 9.99956 1078
Minimal cut set 2 9, 15 0.081 0.0878 1.47256 1074 1.636 1074 0.01693 7.05346 1074
Minimal cut set 3 10 0.08425 0.0915 1.47256 1074 1.636 1074 0.01693 7.05346 1074
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Therefore, no general conclusions can be made as to when
the error experienced will become signi cant. In the exam-
ple given above, the fault tree gave an optimistic value for
the system failure probability and a pessimistic failure
frequency. The Markov method can be used to produce an
accurate assessment for any system featuring secondary
failures. However, the production of a Markov model for
an entire system can require the solution of a large number
of equations. The size of the Markov diagram can explode
exponentially with the number of basic events and is
Fig. 5 System failure probability and frequency from the Markov model
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inef cient for moderate to large-sized systems. Therefore,
the generation of a large Markov model for the entire system
does not provide an ef cient solution to the problem. Two
alternative approaches have been investigated:
(a) fault tree modularization methods,
(b) analysis of basic fault tree structures.
Each of these is described in the sections that follow.
5.1 Fault tree modularization methods
In many cases it is only a small section of the system fault
tree that features the secondary failures. In these circum-
stances it is possible to analyse that section of the fault tree
alone by the more computationally intensive Markov meth-
ods. The section of the fault tree analysed in this way is then
replaced by a super-event in the fault tree structure. The
failure probability and failure intensity of the superevent is
derived from the Markov analysis. Analysing a section of the
fault tree using the Markov approach and substituting the
results back into the larger-scale analysis has become a
standard way of evaluating fault trees where dependencies
such as those associated with standby and sequential systems
are concerned [5, 6]. To perform this type of analysis in an
ef cient way requires the section of the fault tree extracted
for Markov analysis itself to be independent of the remainder
of the fault tree and selected accordingly.
5.2 Basic fault tree structures
A common feature of fault trees that contain secondary
failures is that the secondary failure section of the fault tree
is itself independent of the remainder of the fault tree. In this
situation it permits the use of analytical results obtained
from the assessment of Markov models representing typical
features of the fault tree. This removes the need to perform
the numerical analysis of a larger Markov model and makes
the analysis faster to compute. Consider the example
fault tree shown in Fig. 3 which has two basic fault tree
constructs present (as do many of this type of fault tree).
These are illustrated in Fig. 6. The fault tree section to which
the method is applied must therefore be restructured in
terms of the constructs illustrated. This is achieved by
systematically de ning complex events by pairs of basic
events or other complex events occurring as inputs to the
same gate type. Failure and repair parameters to the complex
events are then derived as follows:
For complex events, CAND, which replace two input
events X and Y into an AND gate, the failure probability,
qCAND, and failure frequency, wCAND, are given by
qCAND qXqY
wCAND qXwY qYwX
For complex events, COR, which replace two input events X
and Y into an OR gate, the failure probability, qCOR, and
failure frequency, wCOR, are given by
qCOR 1 (1 qX)(1 qY)
wCOR (1 qX)wY (1 qY)wX
Construct type 1 has two input events A and B where event A
represents the primary failure of a component and event B the
secondary failure.This construct typeappears twice in the fault
tree shown in Fig. 3 at the highest gate (TOP) and the lowest
gate (G2). Construct type 2 appears where there is some
protection (safety feature) that can mitigate the occurrence
of a potential problem. The event that causes the potential
problem, the initiatingevent, is eventC in this construct. Event
D is an enabling event, failed safety system, that permits the
initiating event to cause the problem. Construct 2 is illustrated
in gate G1 of the fault tree. These two basic constructs have
been analysed separately using Markov models to produce
equations that can be used whenever they occur in a fault tree
structure. Steady state conditionsare assumed to prevail at the
end of each inspection cycle, as seems justi ed by looking at
the graphs shown in Fig. 5.
By determining the probability, qC, and failure intensity,
wC, for a construct, these data can then be used in a superevent
replacing the construct in the fault tree. By performing this
Fig. 6 Basic fault tree constructs
E01703 # IMechE 2004 Proc. Instn Mech. Engrs Vol. 218 Part E: J. Process Mechanical Engineering
ANALYSIS METHODS FOR FAULT TREES THAT CONTAIN SECONDARY FAILURES 99
type of substitutionin a bottom-upmanner for each gate in the
fault tree, a complete assessment can be accomplished for the
secondary failure section.
5.2.1 Construct 1
The Markov model to represent the primary and secondary
failures is illustrated in Fig. 7. Here, lA and lB are the
failure rates for components A (primary failure) and B
(secondary failure) respectively, and nA and nAB are the
repair rates for A and A and B together respectively. States 2
and 3 are failed states for this construct. The state equations
for this module are
dq1
dt
q1(lA lB) q2nA q3nAB
dq2
dt
q1lA q2(nA lB)
dq3
dt
q1lB q2lB q3nAB
where qi is the probability of the system being in state i at
time t.
In the steady state situation solved to give q1, q2, q3
q1
(nA lB)nAB
(nAB lB)(lA nA lB)
q2
nABlA
(nAB lB)(lA nA lB)
q3
lB
nAB lB
The probabilityof the output event of this construct occurring
is determined by
QC1 q2 q3 (1)
The failure intensity for construct 1, wC1, can be determined
by:
wC1 q1(lA lB) (2)
5.2.2 Construct 2
This construct allows for the provision of safety features in
the secondary failure section of the fault tree. The failure of
the safety feature is represented by event D in Fig. 6. If this
has happened and initiating event C then occurs, it is unable
to provide mitigation for event C and the failure propagates
up the fault tree structure. If the initiating event occurs prior
to the enabling event, failure propagation will not result.
The Markov state transition diagram for this is illustrated
in Fig. 8. Here, nCD is the repair rate for events C and D
together. In this case the only failed state is state 4. The
assumption is made that, once both the initiating event and
the enabling event have occurred, repair will be instigated
which will return both to the working state
dq1
dt
(lC lD)q1 nCq2 nDq3 nCDq4
dq2
dt
lCq1 nCq2
dq3
dt
lDq1 (nD lC)q3
dq4
dt
lCq3 nCDq4
These equations were solved for qi, i 1–5 for the steady
state situation to give
q1
(nD lC)nCDnC
a
q2
nCD(nD lC)lC
a
q3
lDnCDnC
a
q4
lClDnC
a
where
a nDnCDnC nCDlCnD nCDl
2
C lDnCDnC
lDlCnC lCnCDnC
Fig. 7 Markov diagram for construct 1 Fig. 8 Markov diagram for construct 2
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The probability, QC2, of the superevent replacing construct 2
is given by
QC2 q4 (3)
The failure intensity of construct 2, wC2, is given by
wC2 lCq3 (4)
5.3 Application to the simple pressure tank system
The above constructs are applied progressively up through
the pressure tank failure fault tree structure illustrated in
Fig. 3. The lowest gate in the structure is an OR gate with
events E and X as inputs. Event X is a secondary failure and
hence this gate type satis es the requirements of construct 1.
Using the failure and repair data for these components and
equations (1) and (2) gives
QG2 0:12767
wG2 3:4893 10
3
Using
l
w
1 Q
n
w
Q
(5)
gives lG2 3.9996 10
73 and nG2 2.7336 10
72.
The next gate to consider in the fault tree, gate G1, has as
inputs gate G2 and the pressure relief valve failure (PRV).
The pressure relief valve is a safety feature and thus an
enabling event. Gate 2 is an initiating event that causes
overpressurization and therefore puts a demand on the safety
feature to respond. This satis es the requirements of
construct 2 where G2 is the initiating event and PRV is
the enabler. Applying equations (3) and (4) to gate G1 yields
QG1 0:019399
wG1 3:14975 10
4
Note that
nG2P
1
tG2 tP
1
36:59 25
0:0162
and therefore lG1 3.2126 10
74 and nG1 1.6237610
72.
Finally, the top gate in the fault tree is considered. Its
structure is the same as that of gate G2 and therefore the
equations developed for construct 1 can be used again, with
the parameters for the tank used for event A and those for
gate G1 used for event B. This gives a prediction for the top
event system failure of
Qtop 0:15285
wtop 2:7219 10
4 h 1
This compares well with the average Markov values of
Qtop 0.1652 and wtop 2.956 10
74h71.
6 CONCLUSIONS
1. If secondary failures are to be modelled in a system
failure probability assessment, accurate results will not
be obtained using the fault tree analysis method. This is
despite suggestions in the literature that the development
of the fault tree should be conducted in a way that
considers this type of failure for each state-of-component
fault that occurs.
2. Markov methods will produce accurate results and can be
applied to the smallest independent section of the fault
tree that contains the secondary failure events. Results
of this are obtained numerically and substituted back into
the system fault tree to replace the section of the fault
tree analysed.
3. If the part of the fault tree that contains the secondary
failures contains events that are independent of the rest of
the fault tree, then constructs can be applied in a bottom-
up manner ef ciently to obtain an estimate of the top
event failure parameters.
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APPENDIX 1
Fault tree quanti cation results
The contributions (assuming basic event independence
and that steady state conditions prevail) are given by the
following.
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For minimal cut set 1 {T}
qC1
lT
lT nT
4:99975 10 5
wC1 lT(1 qC1) 9:9995 10
8 h 1
For minimal cut set 2 {E, PRV}
For the initiating event
qE
lE
lE nE
0:0458
wE lE(1 qE) 1:9084 10
3 h 1
For the enabling event
qPRV
lPRVy 1 e
lPRVy
¡
lPRVtPRV 1 e
lPRVy
¡
lPRVy lPRVtPRV 1 e lPRVy
0:3696
This gives
wC2 wEqPRV 7:0534 10
4 h 1
qC2 qEqPRV 0:01693
For minimal cut set 3 {X , PRV}
For the initiating event
qX
lX
lX nX
0:0458
wX lX(1 qX) 1:9084 10
3 h 1
For the enabling event
qPRV
lPRVy (1 e
lPRVy) lPRVtPRV(1 e
lPRVy)
lPRVy lPRVtPRV(1 e lPRVy)
0:3696
This gives
wC3 wXqPRV 7:0534 10
4 h 1
qC3 qXqPRV 0:01693
The system parameters are then obtained from
Qsys 1 #
n
i 1
(1 qCi) 0:03362
wsys
Xn
i 1
wci#
n
j 1
j i
(1 qcj)
0B@
1CA
1:3868 10 3 h 1
APPENDIX 2
Markov model states
State
number
Component
T
Component
E
Component
X
Component
PRV
System
1 W W W W W
2 F W W W F (C1)
3 W F W W W
4 W (F) F W W
5 W W W U W
6 F F W W F (C1)
7 F (F) F W F (C1)
8 F W W U F (C1)
9 (F) F2 W U F (C2)
10 (F) (F) F2 U F (C3)
11 W W W F W
12 F F W U F (C1)
13 F (F) F U F (C1)
14 F W W F F (C1)
15 (F) F2 F F1 F (C2)
Transitions between states for the full fault tree
State i State j State i State j
1 2 lT 7 1 nTEX
1 3 lE 8 5 nT
1 4 lX 8 12 lE
1 5 lP 8 13 lX
2 1 nT 9 1 nEPT
2 6 lE 9 15 lX
2 7 lX 10 1 nALL
2 8 lP 11 1 nP
3 1 nE 11 9 lE
3 4 lX 11 10 lX
3 6 lT 11 14 lT
4 1 nEX 12 1 nTEP
4 7 lT 12 13 lX
5 8 lT 13 1 nALL
5 9 lE 14 1 nTP
5 10 nX 14 12 lE
6 1 nTE 14 13 lX
6 7 lX 15 1 nALL
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